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Abstract 
Hwang and Sung proposed the micropayment 
scheme for multiple merchants with anonymity and 
untraceability.  Then Bayyapu and Das proposed 
their scheme by improving the performance.  
However, those schemes still suffers the traceability 
by untrustworthy bankers and double spending 
caused by the cooperation attack performed by 
malicious merchants.  Moreover, the performance 
of Bayyapu and Das’s scheme is not better than the 
one of Hwang and Sung’s scheme. 
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1. Introduction 
Micro-payment is an electronic payment system 
major for the transaction with very small amount 
money. For the consideration of efficiency and cost, 
the one-way payword chains for small amount 
payment are created by using one-way hash functions 
[7]. 
In [7], the payword chains should be 
merchant-specific to prevent double spending 
problem.  If some customer wants to transact with 
different merchants, he/she should generate multiple 
payword chains for different merchants, respectively.  
This way is inconvenient for the customers.  
Therefore, some improved micro-payment schemes 
are proposed such that one payword chain can be 
used to transact with multiple merchants [2, 5, 6]. 
To protect the transaction privacy, customers 
need to be anonymous and untraceable during the 
transaction with the merchants.  To provide 
anonymity and untraceability, the blind signature 
scheme [3] may be adopted.  By adopting the blind 
signature scheme over finite elliptic curve fields, 
Hwang and Sung’s micropayment scheme is 
proposed to provide multiple merchants, anonymity, 
and untraceability properties.  Then, by adopting the 
RSA blind signature scheme, Bayyapu and Das 
proposed their scheme to improve the performance of 
Hwang and Sung’s scheme.  Because oonly the 
blind signature schemes are different, those two 
schemes are almost the same. 
Though those two schemes adopt the blind 
signature scheme, they cannot provide anonymity and 
untraceability to protect customers’ privacy.  
Moreover, the double spending is still a serious flaw 
for those two schemes.  In the next section, Hwang 
and Sung’s scheme is reviewed first and our 
comments are also given.  In Section 3, Bayyapu 
and Das’s scheme is reviewed.  Our comment 
showing that Bayyapu and Das’s scheme is not more 
efficient than Hwang and Sung’s scheme is given in 
the same section.  The last section is our conclusion. 
2. Our Comments on Hwang and Sung’s 
Scheme  
2.1 Hwang and Sung Scheme 
Hwang and Sung [5] proposed their multiple 
micro-payments by using one-way hash functions 
and blind signature scheme based on the elliptic 
curve cryptosystem (ECC for short).  To review 
their scheme, some notations should be defined in the 
following table. 
Table 1: Notations in Hwang and Sung’s Scheme  
B Bank 
C Customer 
M Merchant 
IDx ID of x ,where x{B,C,M} 
I Customer individual information 
kx Private key of x,where x{B,C,M} 
Px Public key of x,where x{B,C,M} 
{M}K The ciphertext generated by encrypting on the 
message M with the secret key K 
OI Order information 
 
Hwang and Sung scheme consists of four phases.  
Those phases are described, respectively. 
Registration Phase 
First of all, the bank B generates the public 
elliptic curves EC and the element P on the curves.  
Then B selects a secret key k.  A public key hash 
function h is also published.  Both C and M have to 
register with the bank B, in this phase.  Then C and 
M share the secret keys KCB and KMB with B, 
respectively.  C also selects a pseudonymous IDC, 
which is unique to every customer.   
 
Blinding Phase 
In this phase, the customer C obtains an 
authorized one-hash chain from the bank B, by 
performing the following protocol. 
Step 1: C sends {IDC, I} to B.  Then B validates 
IDc, and computes and sends R′=kP to C. 
Step 2: C selects a random number Wn and 
creates a hash chain Wn, Wn-1, , W1, 
W0 after receiving R′, where Wi= h 
(Wi+1), for i= n-1, n-2, , 1, 0.  Here 
the number n is the limited amount that 
B allows C could spend each time.  
Then C computes R= uR′+vP, m= 
h(R||w0), and m' = m/u, where u and v 
are the random numbers chosen by C.  
C finally sends {m', n}KCB to B.   
Step 3: After obtaining {m', n} by decrypting {m', 
n} KCB, B first checks where or not n is 
smaller than the limited C could spend 
and then computes S' = kBm' + k.  
Finally B sends S' to C. 
Step 4: C computes S = S'u + v and checks 
whether or not SP = mPB + R.  If the 
equation holds, C gets the valid signature 
(R, S) on message m. 
Step 5: B also creates two factors: Tc= h(IDc, rB) 
and Sc= {si|si = h(si + 1, Tc), i = N-1,…, 0}, 
where rB is the random number chosen 
by B and N is the maximal number of 
transaction that C can do on the business. 
Transaction Phase 
After obtain anonymously authorized hash chain 
and the signature (R, S), the customer C can transact 
with some merchants.  Suppose that C wants to 
transact with some merchant M, C, M, and B perform 
the following procedure to complete the kth 
transaction. 
Step 1: C sends the transaction request {AM, IDC, 
IDB}KCB to B, where AM denotes the 
Internet address of the merchant. 
Step 2: B uses each shared secret key to decrypt 
{AM, IDC, IDB}KCB until the decrypted 
IDC matches the identity of actual 
owner’s the decryption key KCB.  If IDC 
is authenticated and valid, the bank B 
randomly chooses a one-time session key 
KCM, and sends {KCM}KCB to C. 
Step 3: C first obtains the KCM by decrypting 
{KCM}KCB.  C computes RCM= 
h(wi⊕(sk||KCM)) and sends {RCM, (R, S, 
m), w0, (wj, t), sk, OI, Exp} KCM to M, 
where t= j-i+1. 
Step 4: M verifies the blind signature (R, S) on 
the message m by using SP = mPB+ R.  
If (R, S) is valid, M checks whether or 
not RCM= h(wj-t+1⊕(sk||KCM)) and w0= 
h
i
(wi), where wj−t+1= h
t−1
(wj).  If RCM= 
h(wj-t+1⊕(sk ||KCM)) and w0= h
i
(wi) hold, 
M starts to selling items to C. 
Redemption Phase 
Suppose that the merchant M wants to redeem the 
received payment {RCM, (R, S, m), w0, (wj , t), sk, OI, 
Exp}, M and B perform the following procedure to 
finish the redemption. 
Step 1: M sends the redemption {RCM, (R, S, m), 
w0, (wj , t), sk, OI, Exp}KMB to B. 
Step 2: B checks the redemption’s validity date, 
verifies the blind signature (R, S) on m, 
and validates the payword (wj, t).  This 
step is the same as Step 4 of the procedure 
in Transaction phase.  Finally, B extracts 
the money from C′s account and transfers 
it to M′s account. 
2.2 Our Comments 
Two security flaws of Hung and Sung’s scheme 
are stated.  The first flaw is that Hwang and Sung’s 
scheme does not satisfy untraceability property.   
On Step 1 in the transaction phase, the customer C 
sends the merchant’s address to the bank to distribute 
the session key KCM between C and M.  By using 
the session key KCM, Bank know the transaction 
detail between the customer C and merchant M.  In 
other word, B can trace the transaction behavior of 
any customer, so Hwang and Sung’s scheme does not 
satisfy untraceability property.  To remove this 
traceability flaw, a trusted key distribution center 
maybe involved to distribute the session key KCM. 
The second flaw is the double spending problem, 
caused by merchants’ conspiracy.  For example the 
customer transacted with two different merchants M1 
and M2.  The customer pays M1 the paywords w1, 
w2, w3,, w6, so the payment P1= (w6, 6) is sends to 
M1.  Then Customer pays M2 the paywords w7, w8, 
w9, so the payment P2= (w9, 3) is sends to M2.  M2 
knows w7, w8, w9, so M2 can give w7 to M1.  After 
obtaining w7, M1 replaces the old payment P1 with 
the new payment P1′= (w7, 7) and submitted the 
payment P1′ in the redemption phase.  The bank 
detects the double spending paywords of the 
customer.  However, the bank cannot distinguish 
this double spending is caused by the customers’ 
double use of the payword or merchants’ conspiracy.  
This dispute of the double spending flaw cannot be 
solved.  Therefore, Hwang and Sung’s scheme 
suffers from the traceability and double spending 
flaws. 
3. Our Comments on Bayyapu and Das’s 
Scheme 
3.1 Bayyapu and Das’s Scheme 
Bayyapu and Das [6] improve the computational 
efficiency of Hung and Sung scheme by replacing the 
ECC-based blind signature scheme with the 
RSA-based blind signature scheme [3, 4].   In the 
following, only the blinding phase of Bayyapu and 
Das’s scheme is described since the other phases are 
the same as the corresponding phases in Hung and 
Sung’s scheme. 
Blinding Phase 
The customer C sends a withdrawal request to the 
bank B and gets the signature on the withdrawal 
message. The bank and the customers perform the 
following protocol. 
Step 1: The bank B chooses two large primes p 
and q, computes λ= pq and ϕ(λ)= 
(p-1)(q-1), and selects the public key PB 
such that 1< PB <ϕ(λ) and gcd(PB, ϕ(λ))= 
1. Finally, find its private key kB such 
that PBkB ≡ 1 mod ϕ(λ). 
Step 2: C first constructs the hash chain wn, wn-1, 
, w1, w0, where wi= h (wi+1), for i= n-1, 
n-2, , 1, 0.  Then C chooses two 
random numbers u and v, computes α= 
u
PBh(w0)(v
2+1) mod λ, and sends (A, α) 
to B, where A denotes the message 
specifying the customer’s cash expiry 
date, the total value of each hash word, 
and the upper limit of the customer 
account on B. 
Step 3: B chooses a random factor x < λ and 
sends x to C. 
Step 4: After receiving x, C selects a random 
number u′ and computes b= uu′ mod λ, β 
= b
PB (v-x) mod λ.  Send β to B. 
Step 5: After receiving β, B computes β-1 mod λ 
and t= h(A)
kB(α(x2+1)β-2)2 
kB mod λ, and 
sends (β-1, t) to C. 
Step 6: After receiving (β-1, t), C computes c= 
(vx + 1)β-1bPB mod λ= (vx+1)(v-x)-1mod 
λ, s = tu2(u')4 mod λ, where (A, c, s) is 
the signature issued by B on the blinded 
messages A and w0. 
The blind signature (c, s) on A and w0 can be 
verified by checking the equation: 
s
PB ≡ h(A)h(w0)
2
(c
2
+1)
2
 mod λ. 
Therefore, on Step 4 in Transaction phase and on 
Step 2 in Redemption phase, the verification of the 
blind signatures adopts this equaiton s
PB ≡ 
h(A)h(w0)
2
(c
2
+1)
2
 mod λ. 
3.2 Our Comments 
Bayyapu and Das’s scheme is also the same as 
Hwang and Sung’s scheme, except the different 
underlying blind signature schemes.  Therefore, 
those two schemes suffer from the traceability and 
double spending flaws. 
Moreover, Bayyapu and Das do not improve the 
computation performance of Hwang and Sung’s 
scheme. The performance comparison [6] between 
Hwang and Sung’s and Bayyapu and Das scheme is 
illustrated in Table 2.  Some notations defined in [6] 
are defined below. 
th : The computation time for hash operation 
tECCa: The computation time for one point 
addition over the elliptic curve. 
tECCe: The computation time for one scalar 
multiplication of a point over elliptic curve. 
ta: The computation time for one modular 
multiplication. 
te: The computation time for one modular 
exponentiation. 
ts: The computation time for symmetric key 
encryption. 
 
Table 2: Blind Phase Performance Comparison 
between Hwang and Sung’s and Bayyapu and Das 
Schemes 
 Blinding Phase  
Hwang and Sung scheme  4th + 7tECCe + 3tECCa + ts  
Bayyapu and Das scheme 2th + 6te  
 
However, the computational cost of one tECCe is 
much cheaper than the cost of one te and the 
computational cost of one tECCa is much cheaper than 
the cost of one ta, even though both the computational 
complexities of tECCe in ECC and te in RSA are all 
cubic in the bit length of the module used [1].  
According to Table 3, for the same security level, the 
bit length of the module in RSA signature scheme is 
much longer than the bit length of the module in the 
ECC signature scheme.  For example, the same 
security level in 80 bit, RSA needs 1024 bits and 
ECC needs 160 bits.  So the bit length of modules in 
RSA is approximately six times than the bit length of 
the module in ECC.  Therefore, the cost of 7tECCe + 
3tECCa is much cheaper than the cost of 6te.  
Consequently, Bayyapu and Das scheme is not more 
efficient than Hwang and Sung scheme. 
 
Table 3: 
Algorithm 
Family 
Cryptosystems 
Security Level (bit) 
80 128 192 256 
Integer 
factorization 
RSA 
1024 
bits 
3072 
bits 
7680 
bits 
15360 
bits 
Elliptic curves 
ECDH, 
ECDSA 
160 
bits 
256 
bits 
384 
bits 
512 
bits 
 
4. Conclusions 
Two security flaws for Hwang and Sung’s 
scheme are pointed out.  One is the traceability flaw 
and one is the double spending problem, caused by 
merchants’ conspiracy.  Because Bayyapu and 
Das’s scheme is also the same as Hwang and Sung’s 
scheme, their scheme also suffers those two security 
flaws.  Moreover, due to our performance analysis, 
Bayyapu and Das’s scheme does not improve the 
computational performance of Hwang and Sung’s 
scheme. 
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